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Stuart Bremer often reminded us that third parties—directly or indirectly—affect the
initiation, evolution, and termination of conflict. He encouraged scholars to research
the phenomenon of joining behavior further and personally investigated it. Questions
about joining behavior are indeed deeply intertwined with a variety of theories of con-
flict. However, existing records on third-party interventions are limited to states’ mili-
tary involvement in conflict. The limitations imposed by the data can lead researchers
to biased or incomplete conclusions about many international phenomena. We heed
Bremer’s encouragement and present here the results of an effort to collect new evi-
dence on nonneutral (partisan) interventions in militarized interstate disputes for the
1946–2001 period. The data we present differ from existing records in that: (1) they
provide information on both third parties’ military and nonmilitary activities; (2) they
broaden the notion of what constitutes a third party by including coalitions of states,
intergovernmental organizations (IGOs), and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs);
(3) they expand the investigation framework by recording interventions that occur before
and after a militarized dispute. We test the usefulness of the data by exploring the issue
of major powers’ interventions in conflicts, as Yamamoto and Bremer did in their 1980
“Wider Wars and Restless Nights” article. We offer strong support for Yamamoto and
Bremer’s finding that major powers drag one another into ongoing conflicts and show
how the data may help us raise and answer new and more complex hypotheses about
third parties and the dynamics of joining behavior.
Keywords conflict, third parties, joining, intervention, major powers
Stuart Bremer is widely remembered for his study of the dyadic conditions that affect the
onset and evolution of conflict. His “Dangerous Dyads” article (Bremer, 1992) is one of the
most frequently cited works in the literature on conflict. One of the article’s many theoretical
and empirical contributions to the field is the fact that it highlights those interstate factors
that lead to the expansion of conflict by means of third party intervention. Some dyads are
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dangerous not just because they are more likely to experience conflict in the first place, but
also because they are characterized by a host of conditions that promote the intervention of
external actors after the initiation of hostilities, thereby leading to the expansion of conflict.
Interest in the dynamics of conflict expansion and in the behavior of third states marks
Stuart Bremer’s work preceding his study of dangerous dyads.1 In his 1980 piece with
Yoshinobu Yamamoto, “Wider Wars and Restless Nights,” Bremer was one of the first
scholars to explore the intervention of major-power states in ongoing wars in systematic
ways, developing a series of probabilistic decision models that went beyond traditional
balance-of-power and bandwagoning approaches. Yamamoto and Bremer (1980) provided
evidence that a major-power state’s decision to intervene in a war is never done indepen-
dently of the surrounding political environment. Rather, it is affected by the decision of
other major-power states. Their general finding was that the probability of a major power
intervening increases if other major-power states have chosen to intervene; it decreases if
other major power states stay out of a war. Through their probabilistic models and with this
finding, Yamamoto and Bremer (1980) anticipated by many years the formal and empirical
investigation of the strategic behavior of states (see, for instance, Signorino, 1999, 2002)
and methodological debates about assumptions of independence across observations in the
estimation of models of interstate conflict.
Throughout his work on dangerous dyads, Bremer never lost sight of the issues of
conflict expansion and intervention by third states. Bremer (1992, 320) cautioned researchers
to keep questions on conflict initiation separate from questions on conflict joining. In his
research, he strove to identify those conflict characteristics and third-party traits that promote
the enlargement of conflicts, rather than its initiation. More recently, he warned that much
work still needed to be done with regard to the factors affecting conflict expansion and
joining behavior (Bremer, 2000). In addition, in private conversations with the present
authors, Bremer argued that partisan interventions by third-party actors—i.e., interventions
in which an actor openly sides with one disputant against another—may well serve as a
form of conflict management. By siding with a disputant, a third party may alter the course
of a conflict to facilitate its termination. Certainly it is the case that nonneutral interventions
are likely to increase the magnitude and intensity of conflict (Cusack & Eberwin, 1982;
Petersen, Vasquez, & Wang, 2004). But such interventions may also change the balance of
power in a dispute so that the combatants may come to perceive negotiation and peaceful
settlement as an acceptable outcome. In more extreme instances, the most effective way for
a third party to manage a conflict is to bring that conflict to an end by helping one side in that
conflict achieve a decisive victory. Nonneutral, partisan third parties may also be effective
at more traditionally conceived forms of conflict management. For example, recent research
has shown that third-party mediators have a greater probability of being successful when
they favor one side in a conflict (Kydd, 2003).
In innumerable ways, Stuart Bremer’s interest in and view of the issue of conflict
expansion and joining behavior, his exhortation to further explore this topic, his work
in the Correlates of War’s (COW) militarized interstate disputes (MIDs) project, and his
studies employing COW data inspired our idea to expand existing records on third-party
interventions beyond what is already present in the MIDs data sets. This paper offers a
descriptive overview of the results of our efforts to collect a broader record of data on third-
party interventions in MIDs for the 1946–2001 period.2 In particular, the main aims of our
project were: (1) to catalogue in greater detail the entire range of partisan actions—beyond
1See also Bremer (1982).
2See Ghosn and Palmer (2003). For an extensive definition of militarized interstate disputes and
the rationale and procedure behind the MID project, see Jones, Bremer, and Singer (1996) and Ghosn,
Palmer, and Bremer (2004).
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militarized action—in which third parties engage; (2) to expand our conception of what
constitutes a third party by including coalitions of states, intergovernmental organizations
(IGOs), and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) in our data; and (3) to enlarge the
temporal framework of current investigations on third parties by including interventions
occurring before and after an MID. The methods we followed in the process of consulting
sources, gathering information, and compiling the data closely resemble the methods Bremer
had perfected in the MIDs project. The philosophy behind the project reflects his ideas
about the role that third parties play in the processes of conflict expansion and conflict
resolution.
This paper begins with a description of the genesis of our project and the methods
followed in our efforts to collect a richer record on third-party partisan interventions in
militarized interstate disputes. It proceeds with a preliminary analysis of some general
patterns and trends emerging from the newly collected data. We place particular emphasis
on the identity of third parties, the frequency of their intervention, and the “techniques” they
use. Finally, we loosely replicate Yamamoto and Bremer’s (1980) study on major power
interventions in conflict, showing that their finding concerning the role of major power
status on the likelihood of intervention in an ongoing conflict is supported, and actually
strengthened, by using the new data.
Collecting New Data on Third Parties: Rationale and
Investigative Framework
The idea of collecting data about third parties’ nonneutral partisan interventions in disputes
stems from an earlier effort to gather information about third parties’ neutral interventions.
Dixon (1993, 1994, 1996), Raymond (1994), and other scholars had emphasized the role
that neutral mediators play in preserving peace between states and in managing conflicts
when hostilities do arise. They also raised concerns about the inadequacy of existing data
on mediation, and the initial focus of our project was to address their concerns by exploring
further third parties’ techniques for peaceful conflict management. While the interest in
mediation and neutral intervention was never abandoned, in part upon Bremer’s suggestion,
the study soon evolved to include information about instances of third parties’ partisan
interventions. Since a record of states’ participation in militarized disputes already exists,3
the question emerges of why we felt it necessary to compile a new dataset of third parties’
participation in MIDs. The answer to this question has several parts.
First, in the process of gathering data on states’ mediatory efforts, we encountered strong
evidence that, in their effort to manage ongoing conflicts, third parties do not intervene in
MIDs only neutrally. Rather, sometimes they choose to side with one of the disputants.
Third parties may not show a manifest preference for either side in a conflict, yet they may
come to see that the most cost-effective or expedient way to bring a conflict to termination
is to favor one side over the other. In some instances, this may be done to redress battlefield
imbalances and bring about a “hurting stalemate” that may force the combatants to the
negotiating table. Other conflicts, instead, may not be reasonably resolved with a negotiated
settlement and may only end with a decisive victory by one side. In addition, several studies
have identified the factors that may affect a third party’s decision to lean toward one side in a
dispute rather than the other (see, for, instance, Altfeld and Bueno de Mesquita, 1979; Kim,
1991; Werner & Lemke, 1997). Thus, our efforts to provide a full picture of third parties’
techniques for conflict management would have been incomplete had we not introduced
partisan interventions in the project.
3In standard MID terminology, such third-party entrants are called “joiners.”
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The second portion of the answer is that we found considerable evidence that states are
not alone in intervening in a partisan fashion to manage a conflict. IGOs and, occasionally,
NGOs do get involved in ongoing militarized disputes by actively taking sides with one
of the disputants. Although their degree of involvement rarely matches that of third-party
states, their intervention may have an impact on the combatants’ perceptions of the strategic
environment and on the menus of options available to them. In addition, such interventions
may influence the behavior of other third parties, including states. Because of the many
ways in which nonstate actors contribute to the evolution of conflict, we felt it necessary to
incorporate nonstate actors into the project about third parties’ interventions.
Third, we soon encountered evidence that third parties do not just intervene militarily in
ongoing MIDs. Rather, they employ a variety of techniques in taking sides with disputants.
Such techniques may range from simply diplomatic expressions of opposition or support
to the actual militarized level as recorded by the MIDs project. We know that states starting
a dispute often take a variety of steps of progressive intensity before resorting to military
force. Similarly, third-party states may resort to a variety of conflict-management techniques
of a nonmilitary nature before resorting to militarized action. Scholars of conflict have
recognized that nonmilitary interventions may alter the course and outcome of an ongoing
conflict (see, for instance, Bueno de Mesquita, 1981; Holsti, 1983). Yet, there is no record
of such interventions. As studies about third parties’ neutral interventions have shown
(Raymond, 1994; Dixon, 1993, 1994, 1996), outcomes generally attributed to traditional
conflict variables such as power relations between states or issues of contention may actually
depend on the undetected—because nonmilitary—participation by third parties.
Fourth, it also became evident that in many instances the decision by third states to
join an ongoing conflict militarily did not occur instantaneously. Many studies of joining
behavior have modeled interventions in ongoing conflicts as a sudden transition from nonin-
volvement to full participation. However, the historical record reveals that a series of steps
of increasing intensity precede in many cases the third party’s decision to commit fully
to a conflict. Steps of increasing intensity often lead to militarized participation. Military
historians have long recognized the idea that conflict initiation involves steps of increasing
intensity, ranging from nonmilitary action toward the use of full-scale military force (see,
for instance, Dupuy & Dupuy, 1993, 1035). Vasquez (1993, 2000, 2004) also documents
and provides evidence that states go through several steps, each involving increasing hos-
tility, before actually resorting to full-scale violence and then to war. It is not necessary for
states to go through each of these steps on their path to war. Some steps can be skipped, and
war may still occur. Similarly, it is not necessary for states that have taken some of these
steps to go all the way to war. Yet, Vasquez (2000) makes it clear that taking each of these
sequential steps raises the likelihood of war. In addition, deescalation of tension becomes
more difficult for each step states choose to take on the escalation ladder. A process similar
to the “steps of war” may also regulate the dynamic by which third parties become military
participants in a dispute.4
Our observations that the decision to join ongoing conflicts extends beyond milita-
rized actions—and that the decision to join often takes shape gradually—raised theoretical
and methodological concerns. If those observations are correct, current research on joining
behavior has very likely been based on a limited set of cases: those cases in which third
parties walked through all of the “steps to joining,” selecting themselves into the sample of
military interventions. Instances in which third parties “tested the waters” and then chose
not to enter a conflict are excluded from most of the existing conflict datasets. Despite
4 Indeed, the progressive involvement of third party states in the escalatory process between two
initiators could be considered as an additional step to war, although such a step need not occur for
two states to start a war.
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the aforementioned theories claiming that nonviolent forms of intervention may alter the
evolution and outcome of conflicts, most existing studies on third-party interventions treat
such occurrences as nonevents. Working with only a small subset of the population of third
parties’ interventions in disputes has a variety of severe implications. It can lead researchers
to misrepresent the tendency of third parties to balance or bandwagon. It can lead to incom-
plete evaluations of the likelihood that states will respect their preconflict commitments. It
can lead to both an underestimation of states’ propensity to become involved in MIDs and to
an overestimation of the propensity to intervene militarily. It can lead to a biased assessment
of the effect of some of the covariates scholars usually find to be associated with joining
behavior. It can lead scholars to incorrectly model the impact that expectations about third
parties’ behavior have on the calculations of the initiators of a conflict. Finally, it can lead to
unsound conclusions about the complex dynamics of conflict expansion in space and time
and about the factors affecting the duration of conflict participation.5 Thus, developing a
richer and broader record of third-party intervention in conflicts has implications for a vast
number of theoretical frameworks and empirical puzzles that have dominated the study of
conflict in recent times, from realism to the opportunity and willingness approach, from
studies of alliance reliability to issues of foreign policy substitutability.
While reasons for building a new record of third-party intervention abound, the prob-
lems associated with the pursuit of that objective can be daunting. Given the complexity
and magnitude of the task involved in identifying and categorizing multiple, often repeated
interventions in MIDs by many third parties of different kinds, the greatest challenge was
to develop a working framework that would allow us to proceed systematically in the col-
lection process. Two crucial choices were made. First, our initial effort was focused on
the interventions as our unit of observation, rather than on the joiners. Second, for a va-
riety of reasons, both practical and theoretical, we chose to pursue a dyadic approach in
the investigation process. We identified 357 dyads that experienced at least one militarized
dispute (as originators) after 1945. We ranked dyads based on the number of militarized
disputes they experienced since the end of World War II. The list is topped by the United
States–Russia (Soviet Union) dyad with 54 militarized disputes. Dyads experiencing only
one militarized dispute clustered at the end of the list. We excluded from the data collection
process dyads experiencing only a day-long dispute.6 These procedural choices left us with
314 post-WWII dyads to investigate.
The second challenge was to identify the range of nonneutral, partisan actions that
third parties may take in MIDs and ascertain that such categories were exhaustive and
mutually exclusive. Through the preliminary analysis of a handful of MID dyads in a pilot
study (Dixon, 1998), categories of partisan interventions were identified and are shown in
Table 1.
5For a more detailed discussion of problems associated with selection bias in international conflict
samples, and especially with the problems generated by selection bias on the dependent variable, see
King, Keohane, and Verba (1994), King and Zeng (2001), and Signorino (2002).
6The choice was made after noticing that a sample of those “one-day, single-dispute dyads” failed
to produce any third-party intervention. In such circumstances, the short duration of the dispute seems
to prevent interventions of any type. It is important to note that our data reduce issues of selection
effects with regard to third-party interventions in disputes, but do not eliminate issues of selection
effects with regard to the dyads themselves, since we investigated only those dyads experiencing at
least a post-WWII militarized dispute. Dyads experiencing at least one dispute may be inherently
different from dyads that never experienced any conflict. However, scholars interested in including
in their analysis dyads that never experience a dispute can do so by integrating our third-party data
with dyadic data from other sources, such as EUGene (Bennett & Stam, 2000). In addition, scholars
can supplement our data with Issue Correlates of War (ICOW) data, which include information about
third-party activities in claims that never escalated to the militarized level (Hensel & Mitchell, 2001?).
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TABLE 1 Third-party intervention techniques: Classification scheme
Nonmilitary
Diplomatic Economic Military
Expression of support Offer of economic assistance Offer of military assistance
Expression of opposition Economic assistance Military assistance
Cease-fire appeal Economic sanctions Military sanctions
Troops withdrawal appeal Threat to use ground troops
Diplomatic assistance Threat to use aircraft
Diplomatic sanctions Threat to use naval ships
Mobilization of ground troops
Mobilization of aircraft
Mobilization of naval ships
Use of ground troops
Use of aircraft
Use of naval ships
To some extent, the possible third-party actions we identified reflect classification
schemes used to catalogue state actions that have been developed in a variety of event data
projects, such COPDAB (Azar, 1980), WEIS (see Vincent, 1983; Goldstein, 1992), KEDS
(Gerner et al., 1994), and, more recently, IDEA (King & Lowe, 2003). Partisan interven-
tions range from simple verbal expressions of support to militarized actions, as identified
by the MIDs project. Verbal expressions of opposition or support must be uttered by an
official representative of a government or organization on behalf of the entire government
or organization in order to be classified as interventions.7 Existing collections of event data
such as WEIS and IDEA assume that verbal expressions of opposition against or support
for another state rank lower on their interstate conflict-cooperation scale (Goldstein, 1992).
We followed the same approach and assumed that verbal expressions reflect a lower level
of commitment or willingness on the part of a third party than more costly forms of in-
terventions, such as economic and military actions. The assumption was also based on the
observation that it is easier for governments or organizations to reverse a position taken in
a simple verbal statement than to back out of agreements or promises involving economic
or military assistance or punishment.
Thus, the second and third categories of third-party partisan interventions group eco-
nomic and military interventions. In both cases, we began with verbal statements involving
promises or threats of military or economic action. Thus, we included official promises
of economic support and official threats of military sanctions. We also chose to include
offers of military assistance and actual military assistance to one party to a dispute when
the information was available. When we reach the level of threats to use force in support
of one party to a dispute, the dataset begins to overlap with MID data. We deemed that this
overlap could be useful to reconstruct the chain of actions of increasing intensity that lead
to the militarization of a partisan intervention whenever such escalation occurs.
Having identified a universe of cases for the investigation and a unit of analysis, the
process of data collection began with the construction of narratives for each individual dyad
from 1946 to 2001. Each narrative described the events leading to one or more militarized
7Government or organization representatives’ unofficial statements were excluded from this
category.
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disputes within a dyad and contained information about potential and actual interventions
by third parties. The information contained in each narrative was derived from a standard
set of primary and secondary sources. Newspapers—in particular The New York Times
and The Times of London—and chronologies, such as Facts on File and Keesing’s Record
of Contemporary Events provided the backbone for each narrative. The description of
events was enriched by pre-existing compilations of interstate conflicts and crisis, such
as Weisburd (1997) and Bercovitch and Jackson (1997), historical almanacs, and, where
available, regional sources.
Several graduate students were responsible for collecting the event information and
compiling the narratives. They were asked to follow a standard operating procedure both
in the investigation of the facts and in the composition of the narratives. Senior researchers
checked the reliability and consistency across narratives produced by different investi-
gators at different stages in the process. Both senior researchers and graduate students
coded the narratives for each post-WWII dyad with the aid of standard code-sheets.8
In addition to identifying the identity of the disputants, the intervening third party, and
the intervention technique, the coding sheets required coders to record the beginning
and end date for each intervention, whether the third party resorted to more than one
technique, how many personnel were involved in the intervention, and the number of
casualties.
One of the biggest challenges was to “unitize” third party interventions, especially
because it is easier to observe the beginning of third-party actions than their end. Because
the intervention was our unit of analysis, it was decided that the beginning and ending date
for verbal intervention should be the date on which a third party makes an appeal, threat,
offer, etc. Because nonverbal interventions last longer than verbal ones and because it is
often difficult to detect their termination, it was decided that their ending date should be the
same as the dispute’s ending date when we could not identify a more precise date from the
sources. For those interventions occurring before or after a dispute, we preferred to leave
ending dates as missing if we could not identify a precise termination.
We also encountered instances of multiple interventions by the same third party in
a dispute and instances in which a third party employs multiple intervention techniques.
Again, we coded repeated interventions by the same third party as separate interventions.
When a third party intervened with multiple techniques at the same time, we coded as “pri-
mary” intervention technique the action reported by most sources. When multiple sources
were not available, we coded as primary technique the intervention technique most strongly
emphasized in the record according to the coder’s judgment. On 139 occasions (7.69 per-
cent of the total interventions), third parties used two intervention techniques. In 27 cases
(1.55 percent of the total), a third party employed three intervention techniques simultane-
ously. We found no evidence of third parties using more than three intervention techniques
at the same time. Most instances of multiple intervention techniques are combinations of
multiple verbal appeals or threats (for instance, a simultaneous appeal for a cease-fire and
troop withdrawal to one party in a dispute) or the employment of multiple forms of military
force (for instance, the simultaneous use of ground troops and air force).9 Where multiple
8For a more detailed discussion about the investigation and coding procedure, about potential
problems with bias in the primary and secondary sources, and about pros and cons of human coding
versus machine coding, see Corbetta (2003).
9The use of terms such as “primary technique” or “secondary technique” may suggest a hier-
archy in the importance of multiple forms of intervention. However, we were reluctant to make any
assumption about a third party’s actual preference for any specific technique. Lest too much meaning
is assigned to that classification, we want to stress that the terms simply reflect what transpired from
historical records and/or the coders’ judgment.
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intervention techniques were employed, the ending date of the intervention was the ending
date of the “primary” technique.10
To guarantee consistency in the events being coded, several intercoder reliability checks
were conducted. At the end of the research process, of the 314 post-WWII dyads experienc-
ing at least one dispute longer than one day, 176 witnessed third-party interventions of some
sort. The total number of interventions catalogued in the dataset is 1809. This is quite a
larger number of interventions than the 355 post-WWII militarized interventions contained
in version 3.0 of the MID dataset. There is a mean of 10.28 interventions per dyad, if only
the dyads experiencing interventions are taken into account. The mean is 5.76 per dyad if
all post-WWII dyads experiencing at least one dispute longer than one day are included.
During the process of compilation of the dyads’ narratives, it soon became evident
that third parties do not just intervene in the course of a militarized dispute. A cursory
overview of the first narratives compiled suggested that, unless a MID starts suddenly and
unexpectedly without a preceding crisis, third parties are likely to intervene before and/or
after the militarization of a dispute. Although it is important to keep in mind that we only
looked at dyads experiencing at least one militarized dispute, it is plausible that nonneutral
intervention in a crisis preceding a MID can have an effect on the likelihood that the crisis
will become a militarized incident. Intervention in the phases following the termination of a
MID may have an impact on the recurrence of MIDs within the same dyad of originators. We
deemed the collection of data about potential interventions surrounding the actual start and
end of a militarized dispute to be of theoretical relevance. We established the procedure of
researching events occurring two weeks before and after a dispute. That two-week window
could expand if we encountered evidence of a brewing crisis or of extended dispute de-
escalation. Following Dixon (1998), we maintained a distinction between interventions
that are “precipitated” by a specific MID—those interventions occurring between the start
and end date of a dispute—and interventions surrounding a MID. Overall, 340 third-party
interventions (19.03 percent of the total) occurred before or after a militarized dispute. The
remaining interventions were, instead, precipitated by an ongoing dispute. The following
section describes some of the information extracted from the preliminary analysis of 1809
instances of third-party interventions for the 1946–2001 period.
Descriptive Analysis of the Data and Some Preliminary Findings
It is a good but often forgotten practice for all researchers to get to know the structure of
their own data before diving into testing hypotheses through ultrasophisticated economet-
ric models. Descriptive analysis of the available data can provide substantive information
about real-life political phenomena; it may suggest new hypotheses to explore; it may pre-
vent one from investigating hypotheses or adopting models that make little sense in light
of the data available and the processes that generate them. One of the first things to ask—
especially with international relations data—is how one’s data are distributed over time.
Figure 1 shows the number of interventions per year since the end of WWII. The year with
the most interventions (117) is 1968, immediately followed by 1970 with 96 interventions.
The Vietnam War was indeed a catalyst for third-party interventions, arguably because of
both its duration and the nature of the actors and political interests involved in the conflict.
Figure 1 also reveals peaks in the number of third-party interventions in connection to
10A future goal of this project is to produce an additional version of the data centering on third-
party states as the unit of analysis. The objectives are: (1) to disaggregate interventions in which
secondary and tertiary intervention techniques were employed into individual interventions; and (2)
to disaggregate interventions by coalitions and IGOs into individual interventions for the participating
states.
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FIGURE 1 Frequency of third-party interventions per year, 1946–2001.
major conflicts. There were 77 interventions in 1951, at the apex of the Korean War. There
were 68 and 81 interventions during 1983 and 1986, respectively. Many interventions in
1983 were associated with the U.S. invasion of Grenada and Soviet action in Afghanistan.
United States action against Libya in 1986 also drew a lot of opposition from the inter-
national community. The large number of interventions in 1992 is due to the skirmishes
between the United States, Britain, and Iraq following the end of the first Gulf War, to the
numerous conflicts that followed the disintegration of the Soviet Union, and to the Bosnian
crisis.
The data shown in Figure 1 include both precipitated interventions (i.e., those that
occurred within the temporal boundaries of a militarized dispute) and nonprecipitated in-
terventions (i.e., interventions occurring before or after the official beginning and end of
a disputes). Analysis not shown here indicates that there is not a remarkable relationship
pattern between the number of MID-precipitated interventions and the total number of in-
terventions in a given year. That is, the frequency of nonprecipitated interventions is not
simply a reflection of the total number of interventions. Similarly, there is no indication
that the number of interventions in any year and over time is simply a function of the
number of militarized disputes in that year. The relationship between MID occurrences per
year and the number of third-party interventions is actually negative. Figure 2 compares
the frequency of militarized disputes per year and the frequency of third-party interven-
tions per year after WWII. A visual inspection of the graph seems to confirm the results
of correlation analysis. No consistent pattern of covariation between MID occurrences and
third states’ interventions seems to emerge. This also indirectly suggests the hypothesis
that it is not the number of militarized disputes occurring in a given year that determines
the number of third-party interventions. Rather, the specific traits of certain disputes and
the characteristics of the actors involved seem to be more likely to draw third-party inter-
ventions. Hypotheses about those states’ and disputes’ characteristics that may precipitate
militarized interventions have been raised in works by Kaw (1990), Kim (1991), Smith
(1996), Werner and Lemke (1997), and Yamamoto and Bremer (1980). Some preliminary
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FIGURE 2 Frequency of third-party interventions and militarized interstate disputes per
year, 1946–2001.
analysis on this issue with the present data (not shown here) suggests that differences exist
between those disputes and state traits that elicit militarized interventions and those dispute
and state traits that promote nonmilitary interventions.
Since not all interventions in the data are military in character, it is important to ex-
plore the relative frequency of intervention over time by intervention technique. Of the
1809 interventions, 1283, or 70.92 percent of the total, are diplomatic. Another 413 inter-
ventions (22.83 percent) are military. Only 113 interventions (6.25 percent) are economic
in character. Thus, third parties seem to prefer either diplomatic or military interventions to
economic ones. While this phenomenon awaits a systematic explanation, it is plausible that
diplomatic and military interventions are more frequent simply because states, who con-
stitute the majority of interveners, prefer such techniques. Economic aid and, especially,
economic sanctions can be more effective if implemented collectively—often in the context
of international organizations. Economic interventions can be rather expensive forms of in-
terventions that may have a long-term impact, while states look for forms of intervention
with immediate impact that do not require coordination among a large number of actors.
Most important, these figures reinforce the idea that military interventions constitute only a
relatively small share of joining activities occurring during or around militarized disputes.
In addition to the use, display, or threat to use force, third parties have at their disposal other
techniques for influencing the outcomes of international conflicts. The military option is
frequently employed, but its use is just not as frequent as one would conclude by looking
at the existing conflict datasets. This seems to be consistent with the fact that the majority
of militarized disputes recorded in the MID data sets remain bilateral.
Figure 3 shows the frequency of diplomatic, economic, and military third-party inter-
ventions for the entire post-WWII period, regardless of whether the interventions occurred
during a MID (those we labeled as “precipitated” interventions) or not. Visual inspection
of the graph suggests that there is no consistent pattern of covariation between different
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FIGURE 3 Frequency of interventions by third-party technique per year, 1946–2001.
types of third-party interventions. The frequencies of diplomatic, military, and, to a lesser
extent, economic interventions mirror each other until the mid-1960s. Arguably because of
the Vietnam War, we see a sharp divergence in the frequency of military and diplomatic
interventions lasting for approximately a decade. The same pattern is observable during the
1980s. As noted previously, both time periods were marked by intense superpower activity.
Dispute involvement by major powers is likely to draw the attention and participation—
both in support of and against—of other states. These patterns seem to confirm the notion
that conflicts involving major-power states are more likely to expand. The years with the
highest number of military interventions are 1951 and 1992, with 28 and 25 militarized
third-party involvements, respectively. Such a high number of military interventions are
related to the Korean War and to post–Gulf War skirmishes between Iraq and the coalition
forces.
Since most of the existing studies on joining behavior have focused on military in-
terventions, it is worth asking whether there is any relationship between the frequency
of military interventions and the frequency of third-party interventions overall. That is, is
the frequency of military interventions relatively constant over time? Or does it fluctuate
with other types of military interventions? It appears that the number of military inter-
ventions in a given year is not a function of the total number of third-party participations
in that year (Pearson’s r = .47). On the other hand, because the number of diplomatic
interventions overall is such a great fraction of the total number of interventions, it is no
surprise that strong correlation between the two exists (Pearson’s r = .96). The number of
economic interventions is a much smaller fraction of the total number of interventions.
It peaks in 1951, due to the numerous sanctions against China for its intervention in
the Korean War. But it remains steady over time, experiencing only minor oscillations
in the late 1970s to early 1980s, due to the Iranian hostage crisis, the Soviet invasion of
Afghanistan, and the U.S. invasion of Grenada, and in the mid 1990s, due to sanctions
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against Iraq and the former Yugoslav countries. It is worth noting that there is no dis-
cernible change in patterns of frequency in type of intervention over time if only precipitated
interventions—those occurring within the temporal boundaries of a MID—are included in
the analysis.
Who Intervenes?
After describing investigation criteria and general trends in the data, the question of who
intervenes is arguably the most important one to be addressed. As mentioned above, we
recorded data on different types of third parties: states, IGOs, NGOs, and coalitions of
states. Although states form the bulk of third party interveners, it is possible for nonstate
actors to affect the evolution and outcome of a dispute or rivalry by either managing or
escalating the conflict. Table 2 shows the overall frequency of third-party interventions by
type and intervention technique.
The table confirms that states are the actors who intervene the most in other states’
disputes, regardless of the intervention technique employed. Participation by other actors
is a less frequent event. IGOs and NGOs are, in fact, more likely to intervene in conflicts in
a neutral, rather than partisan, form. The notable exception here is the IGOs’ proclivity to
resort to diplomatic means of partisan intervention. Although it is not shown here, evidence
indicates that such interventions take the form of expression of opposition or appeal for
cease-fire directed to only one side in a conflict. The coalition of states category is somewhat
underrepresented due to the stricter coding rules employed. In order for a group of states to
intervene as a coalition, there had to be evidence of coordinated multilateral action among
third parties from the first day of the intervention. Lacking such evidence, we preferred
to code uncoordinated collective interventions or situations in which a coalition against
a disputant took shape over time as separate state interventions. Nonetheless, this strict
definition manages to capture the most evident instances of multilateral coordinated action,
such as the 1991 Gulf War. Again unsurprisingly, NGOs are less likely to intervene in
TABLE 2 Relative frequencies of interventions by third
party type and intervention technique, 1946–2001
Diplomatic Economic Military Total
States 843
66.69
65.71
82
6.49
72.57
339
26.82
82.08
1264
100.00
69.87
Coalitions 56
61.54
4.36
12
13.19
10.62
23
25.27
5.57
91
100.00
5.03
IGOs 357
83.80
27.83
18
4.23
15.93
51
11.97
12.35
426
100.00
23.55
NGOs 27
96.43
2.10
1
3.57
0.88
0
0.00
0.00
28
100.00
1.55
Total 1282
70.91
100.00
113
6.25
100.00
413
22.84
100.00
1809
100.00
100.00
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partisan fashion. When they do so, they employ the only means they have: verbal expression
of opposition or public appeals for cease-fires and troop-withdrawal.11
It can be argued that the distinction between states, IGOs, and coalitions as interven-
ers can be analytically important but often too vague. After all, IGOs rarely or never act
without the consent of their member-states, and especially major powers. Similarly, it can
be difficult to think of a coalition of states as a unitary actor operating independently of
its constituent states. It is then important to point out that the present third-party interven-
tion data contain information that allows researchers to disaggregate the actions by IGOs
and coalitions into actions by individual states. When a group of states or an international
organization carries out an intervention, the name and number of individual states tak-
ing part in the intervention are recorded when the information is available.12 With regard
to interventions by coalitions and economic and military interventions by IGOs, data on
the individual participating states is available in most cases. The same information is less
frequently available for diplomatic interventions by IGOs, which in many cases involve col-
lective official statements and resolutions passed by a majority vote by the IGO collective
bodies.
We have shown the distribution of interventions over time by type above. What is,
then, the distribution of interventions by third party type over the 1946–2001 period?
Figure 4 shows temporal fluctuations in the frequency of interventions by states, coali-
tions of states, and IGOs. NGO interventions have not been included due to their small
number. Clearly, the pattern observed is not dissimilar to patterns displayed earlier. The
number of interventions by states and IGOs seems to follow one another fairly closely until
the mid-1960s, when the number of state interventions skyrockets. The frequencies of state
and IGO interventions return to following one another again in the 1980s. However, what
is more interesting to notice is the slow but steady increase in the number of IGO inter-
ventions over time. This growth is detectable especially after 1980 and peaks in the early
1990s, when IGO interventions were even more numerous than state interventions. The
data provide support to well-known accounts concerning the evolution, successes, and fail-
ures of IGO conflict-management attempts after WWII (see, for instance, Mingst & Karns,
1999).
Because the vast majority of third-party participants are individual states, the following
section focuses on patterns of state intervention in militarized disputes. Particular attention
is given to the question of which states and what type of states actually get involved in
ongoing MIDs.
Which States Intervene?
Given that the vast majority of interventions in ongoing disputes are carried out by states,
it is important to ask, which states tend to intervene more than others? What are those
state-level traits that make some countries more prone to joining in a conflict than others?
11The low number of IGO and NGO interventions in the dataset may be surprising. The low
number is explained by the fact that our list of IGOs and NGOs was based on lists of such organizations
derived from the Union of International Agencies (UIA). Rebel groups, terrorist organizations, and
other nonstate actors, as reported by Lemke (2003), may wield considerable resources and act in
state-like fashion as third parties in conflicts. Yet, because of various resource constraints, we could
not include those interventions in the present version of the data.
12Discrepancies in the number of militarized interventions between the MID data and the present
data are largely due to the fact that many state interventions that the MID data record as individual
action qualify as collective interventions under our classification scheme. We are currently developing
a version of the data in which collective interventions by coalitions and IGOs are disaggregated by
participating state.
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TABLE 3 Most active third-party states (15+
interventions), 1946–2001
Diplomatic Economic Military Total
US 141 21 134 296
Russia/USSR 123 4 31 158
China 60 1 17 78
France 43 3 29 75
UK 51 6 15 72
Egypt 31 0 9 40
Australia 14 4 6 24
India 20 1 0 21
Iran 17 0 4 21
Germany 14 2 3 19
Syria 11 0 4 15
Jordan 11 0 4 15
Japan 10 5 0 15
Canada 9 5 1 15
Cuba 9 2 4 15
Total 564 54 261 879
Even a superficial overview of the data may provide preliminary answers to these questions
and suggest more precise hypotheses to explore further. Table 3 shows the number and
type of interventions by the most active states. We arbitrarily chose 15 interventions over
the 1946–2001 period as the cut-off point because there seems to be a considerable gap
FIGURE 4 Frequency of interventions by third party type, 1946–2001.
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between states with these many interventions and the vast majority of less active states.
These states account for about 50 percent (879 interventions out of 1809) of all post-WWII
joining behavior and for about 70 percent of the 1264 state interventions.
The table suggests that the permanent members of the UN Security Council have earned
that position for a reason: they carry out a preponderant amount of all third-party activity:
679 interventions out of 1264 state interventions, or approximately 53 percent of the total.
The permanent members of the Security Council also seem to hold a monopoly on the use
of military force. The Security Council’s permanent members also account for 66 percent
of all state military interventions (226 out of 339). Great Britain, the least militarily active
among the “Big Five,” has almost twice as many military interventions as Egypt, the closest
“runner-up.” Beyond the five permanent members, we find—not unsurprisingly—regional
great powers, close allies of the United States, and aspiring great powers. The most active
joiners are Western states, but the Middle East is—again unsurprisingly—overrepresented.
The African continent is underrepresented despite the large number of conflicts fought in
the region after WWII.
With regard to individual third-party states, the table above suggests that approximately
one-fourth of all post-WWII joining behavior is attributable to the United States, which reg-
istered 294 out 1264 total interventions. The gap between the U.S. level of foreign policy
involvement and that of its competitors is striking. The United States has almost twice as
many interventions as Russia/USSR, the second-most active intervener. The figures may
provide supporting evidence to the argument that, beyond the idea of bipolarity, the Cold
War international system was truly a hegemonic system. There also is remarkable dis-
parity within the five great powers and other internationally active states in regard to the
use of military intervention techniques. The United States has four times as many mili-
tary interventions as Russia and France, the second- and third-most militarily active states.
The United States has a disproportionate number of economic interventions compared to
other countries—arguably a reflection of the disparity between American economic power
and the economic power of other countries. Despite the availability of greater economic
means, the United States has nevertheless preferred military techniques to other techniques.
Forty-five percent of US joining actions are military. In comparison, only thirty-eight
percent (approximately) of France’s—the second-most active joiner—interventions are
military.
The data provide a good portrait of the post-1945 international system. Frequency and
intensity of joining behavior can be good indicators not just of major power status, but also
of hegemonic status. Major power states intervene more often than other states in militarized
disputes and are more likely to do so with military means. Figure 5 shows temporal patterns
similar to those outlined earlier. Even for major-power states, the temporal patterns in
the frequency of militarized and nonmilitarized (diplomatic and economic) interventions
track each other over time closely, with the exception of the mid-1960s to mid-1970s period.
However, the proportion of militarized to nonmilitarized interventions appears much higher
in the early stages of the Cold War. There seems to be a slightly temporal trend of diminishing
militarized interventions vis-a`-vis nonmilitarized interventions that deserves further scrutiny
in the future.
Moving beyond the descriptive statistics just presented, Table 4 evaluates the strength
of the relationship between major-power status and the propensity to intervene militarily,
showing that the association is strongly (statistically) significant. The association is also
strong between major-power status and diplomatic intervention, but weaker with regard to
major-power status and the tendency to intervene with economic means. The inclusion of
data concerning forms of intervention other than military ones does not alter the relationship
between major-power status and joining behavior. Rather, the data bring to the light more
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FIGURE 5 Frequency of major-power states’ militarized and nonmilitarized interventions
in interstate disputes, 1946–2001.
strongly those behavioral differences between great powers and “ordinary states” that are
frequently highlighted in the conflict literature.
Major-Power States and Interventions in Disputes
Descriptive and univariate analysis of the data provide sufficiently strong evidence that,
with regard to joining ongoing disputes, major-power states behave quite differently from
other states. And it was indeed the behavior of the great powers that was of special interest
to Stuart Bremer. In his aforementioned “Wider Wars and Restless Nights” piece with
Yamamoto, Bremer explored a set of hypotheses concerning the tendency of major states
to become involved in ongoing wars. By definition, major-power states differ from minor
powers not only with regard to material capabilities, but also with regard to the range of
their foreign policy interests and their degree of activity on the international arena (Singer
& Small, 1972). Because of this, Yamamoto and Bremer (1980) indirectly argued, major
power states are more likely to (1) become involved in ongoing wars and (2) to drag one
another into wars, generating a spiraling dynamic of conflict enlargement.
At a time when multistage selection models and strategic interaction models were
yet to be “discovered” and could not easily be implemented with commercial software,
Yamamoto and Bremer (1980) tested their hypotheses with a series of probabilistic models,
which they labeled “independent choice,” “one-way conditional choice,” and “two-way
conditional choice.” The independent choice model assumes that each major-power state
joins a war without considering the actions of other major-power states, and therefore the
probability of joining remains constant for each major power. The one-way and two-way
conditional choice models, instead, test the hypotheses that major-power states base their
decision to enter an ongoing conflict on the actions of other major powers. More specifically,
 at GRAND VALLEY STATE UNIV LIB on June 11, 2013cmp.sagepub.comDownloaded from 
Third Parties in Interstate Disputes 55
TABLE 4 Association between major-power status and
intervention techniques
Nonmajor power Major power Total
Military intervention
No 470
80.76
455
66.72
595
73.18
Yes 112
19.24
227
33.28
682
26.82
Total 926 339 1264
Chi-square = 31.5411; Pr = 0.0000.
Economic intervention
No 535
91.92
647
94.87
1182
93.51
Yes 47
8.08
35
5.13
82
6.49
Total 582 682 1264
Chi-square = 4.4853; Pr = 0.034.
Diplomatic intervention
No 159
27.32
262
38.42
421
33.31
Yes 423
72.68
420
61.58
843
66.69
Total 582 682 1264
Chi-square = 17.4078; Pr = 0.0000.
war entry by a major power increases the probability that other major powers will join.13
They found that the two conditional choice models perform better than the independent
choice model, and that successive major-power interventions increase the probability of
future major-power interventions.
Without necessarily replicating Yamamoto and Bremer’s (1980) probability models, we
have used the data presented in the preceding sections to test the hypotheses they developed
and to investigate whether their findings hold if we extend the analysis to interventions in
militarized disputes and to all forms of intervention, military and nonmilitary. We did this
through a series of logistic regression models. The first set of models is similar to Yamamoto
and Bremer’s (1980) independent choice model in that it simply predicts whether major-
power status affects the probability that a state will join a dispute. The second set of models,
instead, is similar to Yamamoto and Bremer’s (1980) conditional choice models because
it predicts whether the number of major-power states that have joined a dispute at time t
affects the probability that another major-power state will join at time t + 1.
13The difference between the one-way conditional choice and the two-way conditional choice
models is that the former is based on sampling without replacement and predicts that the probability
of major-power involvement always increases if other major powers join. The two-way conditional
choice model instead allows for the prediction that the probability of major-power intervention may
increase or decrease depending on the number of major powers that have joined the conflict at time t
(Yamamoto & Bremer, 1980, 205–209).
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We operationalized our dependent variable as a dummy variable coded 1 if a major-
power state joins an ongoing dispute, and 0 if it does not. We tested whether major-power
status and previous number of major-power joiners affect the overall likelihood that a third
party will join, the likelihood that it will join militarily, and the likelihood that it will join
nonmilitarily, i.e., adopting a diplomatic or economic technique. Since the dataset includes
only instances of intervention, we merged our data with a dispute-dyad year dataset created
with version 3.0 of the EUGene software (Bennett & Stam, 2000). We matched all post-1945
dyads of MIDs originators with all potential joiners for a given dyad-dispute year.14 For the
second set of models, we used only the potential major-power joiners. Finally, we excluded
nonprecipitated interventions, i.e., interventions that occur either immediately before or
immediately after a MID.
We included in the model a set of control variables found to be associated with the
probability of intervention in the literature on joining behavior. We chose to control for
material capabilities because their possession increases a state’s opportunity to become
involved in an ongoing conflict.15 Material capabilities are measured with the well-known
Correlates of War’s CINC score. Because so many third-party interventions in MIDs are
carried out by the United States and other Western democracies, we chose to control for the
regime type of potential and actual joiners. We measured regime type with the Polity III
democracy autocracy index. Because new evidence suggests that alliance pacts are actually
quite reliable (Leeds, Long, & McLaughlin Mitchell, 2000), we controlled for the presence
of an alliance between third parties and either—but not both—disputants. We followed
Altfeld and Bueno de Mesquita (1979) in assuming that a third party will be indifferent
between two dispute originators—and therefore not likely to intervene—if it has an alliance
with both. A large number of studies have found contiguity to be strongly related to the
expansion of conflict in space. We included contiguity in the model as a dummy variable
that takes the value of 1 if a third party is directly contiguous to or separated by less than 150
miles of water from either or both disputants, and 0 otherwise. Finally, because disputes
that are more violent are likely to draw states’ attention and to increase the likelihood
of intervention in general and militarized intervention in particular, we controlled for the
hostility level of the dispute. This set of control variables is by no means exhaustive. A much
wider variety of factors have been found to affect the probability of third-party intervention
in the literature. Yet, because their inclusion would move us away from the original focus
of Yamamoto and Bremer’s study, we chose to keep the model as simple as possible.
The results of the logistic regression analysis are presented in Tables 5 and 6. In
both sets of models, estimates are clustered on the individual dispute to take into account
within-group dependence of observations. Robust standard errors are used. Yamamoto and
Bremer (1980) had found weak support for their independent choice model. The models
in Table 5 suggest that, when we expand our empirical domain to include different forms
of third-party interventions in militarized disputes, major-power status has an independent
significant effect on the probability of intervention. This effect persists after controlling for
the variables usually associated with joining behavior and regardless of whether we look at
the probability of military intervention or the probability of nonmilitary intervention. These
14For obvious reasons, we excluded joiner–originator dyads. It is important to note that our
intervention data is also based only on originator dyads and excludes joiner–originator dyads.
15Almost all major power states have large material capabilities. Yet, the definition of what
constitutes a major power extends beyond possession of material means. Rather, it has to do more
with a state’s foreign policy behavior. In the data used to run the analysis, the correlation between
major power status and capabilities was high but still below levels that would generate concerns with
multicollinearity. For further discussion of the relationship between material capabilities and major
power status, see Corbetta and Dixon (2004).
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TABLE 5 Logit estimates of the effect of major-power status on the likelihood of
third-party intervention, 1946–2001 (robust standard errors in parentheses)
All interventions Military Nonmilitary With controls
Major power 3.40 (.15) 3.89 (.19) 3.17 (.13) 1.94 (.16)
Capabilities — — — 8.80 (1.15)
Regime type — — — .024 (.008)
Alliance — — — .768 (.15)
Contiguity — — — 1.12 (.13)
Hostility level — — — 1.82 (.64)
Constant −5.49 (.24) −7.52 (.19) −6.17 (.27) −13.9 (2.61)
N 215682 215682 215682 192969
Log likelihood −5899.4469 −1921.05 −4649.5133 −3739.4621
P 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
results confirm the impression developed in previous sections that frequencies and modes of
interventions in ongoing conflicts are largely shaped by the decision of major-power states.
They also reinforce the argument that major-power status is not just an attribute based
on capabilities. Rather, it is an attribute with several behavioral dimensions, and joining
behavior is one such dimension.
Table 6 presents results of logit regression on just the major-power states’ decisions to
intervene. It is similar to Yamamoto and Bremer’s (1980) conditional choice models because
each major power’s choice at time t+1 depends on the number of major-power states that
have previously joined the dispute. The results indicate that Yamamoto and Bremer’s (1980)
conclusions about the propensity of dragging one another into conflicts holds true despite
the changes we brought to the definition of conflict and to the meaning of intervention.
Nonmilitary interventions by major-power states increase the likelihood of nonmilitary
interventions by other major powers. Similarly, the likelihood of military interventions is
affected by previous major powers’ military interventions. The number of major powers in
disputes affects the overall likelihood of further major power entry, regardless of type of
intervention and control variables.
TABLE 6 Logit estimates of the effects of previous major-power intervention on major
powers’ decision to join, 1946–2001 (robust standard errors in parentheses)
All interventions Military Nonmilitary With controls
Major powers 0.05 (.01) .026 (.007) .05 (.008) .036 (.006)
interventions at t
Capabilities — — — 8.52 (1.04)
Regime type — — — .004 (.013)
Alliance — — — .228 (.182)
Contiguity — — — .90 (.245)
Hostility level — — — 1.18 (.43)
Constant −3.00 (.12) −3.85 (.14) −3.52 (.15) −9.43 (1.74)
N 8072 8072 8072 7880
Log likelihood −1946.0956 −949.32 −1394.0957 −1324.2198
P 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
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With regard to the models’ control variables, they all individually increase the likelihood
of third-party intervention. As hypothesized in previous sections, being a democracy makes
it more likely that a state will intervene in a dispute. Material capabilities, contiguity with
the disputants, and the level of hostility within the dispute all significantly increase chances
of third-party intervention, regardless of whether we consider militarized or nonmilitarized
interventions. The only control variable that changes from one set of models to the next
is the presence of alliances. Alliance with either dispute originators makes it more likely
for a third party to join, but it does not affect the decision of major-power states. There
are several reasons that may explain this change in results. First, major-power states have
more alliance ties than minor powers and therefore are more likely to have alliances with
both disputants—an occurrence that we coded as zero. Second, major-power states truly are
concerned with each other’s actions, and that concern is so great that it overrides promises
and commitments previously made to other states. Finally, as indicated by Leeds, Long, and
McLaughlin Mitchell (2000), alliance commitments have too many degrees of complexity
and specificity to be coded as a simple dichotomous variable.
Although rather simplistic and not completely faithful to their approach, this multivari-
ate analysis goes one step beyond Yamamoto and Bremer’s (1980). It does not fully capture
the intricacies of their probabilistic models, but it reflects the substance of their empirical
puzzle and their theoretical approach. It reinforces Yamamoto and Bremer’s (1980) intu-
ition that joining behavior in conflict is a phenomenon largely dominated by major-power
states and by their concerns with each other’s actions. The use of a new dataset allows us to
better describe the contours of the relationship between major-power status, major-power
interaction, and intervention in conflict. It becomes possible to eliminate some of the re-
strictions that Yamamoto and Bremer (1980) imposed on their own findings and to conclude
that major-power states tend to drag one another not just into wars but also into disputes.
It is also possible to speculate that the widening of conflicts described by Yamamoto and
Bremer (1980) begins before the militarization of interventions. The major powers’ “fatal
attraction” toward one another and toward violent conflict begins at the level of diplo-
matic and economic involvement in other states’ disputes.16 The present analysis does not
explore the question of whether nonmilitary intervention increases the probability of suc-
cessive militarized intervention. Yet, the use of our data places Yamamoto and Bremer’s
(1980) findings—and the results presented in the existing literature on joining behavior—
in a different light by adding a new dimension to the dynamic of conflict evolution and
escalation.
Conclusions
Potential and actual interventions by third parties in ongoing conflicts have enormous impact
not only on the evolution and outcomes of such conflicts but also on the their initiation.
States contemplating the decision to start a confrontation take into consideration possible
third-party interventions (Bueno de Mesquita, 1981) and, after starting a conflict, behave in
such as a way as to keep third parties out of the conflict (Werner, 2000). Stuart Bremer was
among the first to understand and explore the role of third parties, and in particular of major-
power states, in interstate conflicts. His interest in the issue of joining behavior extended
to his analysis of dangerous dyads, as he pointed out that certain dyads are especially
dangerous because they invite third-party interventions and contribute to the expansion of
16Note that neither Yamamoto and Bremer’s (1980, 225) nor the present analysis says anything
about the direction of major powers’ involvement. It would be erroneous to conclude from these results
that major-power states intervene against one another in ongoing conflicts. We can only conclude that
major powers draw one another into conflicts.
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interstate conflict. At different stages in his career, Bremer encouraged scholars of conflict
to pay more attention to the phenomenon of joining behavior.
Bremer’s encouragement and work played an important role in shaping our efforts to
collect a new, broader record of third parties’ partisan—nonneutral—interventions in mili-
tarized disputes for the post-WWII period. While several records of third-party involvement
in conflicts already exist, such records are limited to military interventions by states in wars
and disputes and therefore allow us to draw only limited conclusions about joining behav-
ior. Depending on the research question one tries to answer, such conclusions may also be
biased because of the processes by which some states select themselves into the sample
of military joiners. These shortcomings have substantive implications for many theoreti-
cal approaches to the studies of international conflict, ranging from the competing realist
claims about balancing versus bandwagoning to models of spatial diffusion of conflict.
Our data attempt to remedy such shortcomings by bringing into the picture, in addition to
militarized interventions by third states, (1) interventions by third parties other than states,
and especially by coalitions, IGOs, and NGOs; (2) nonmilitary forms of interventions, with
particular emphasis on diplomatic and economic forms of joining behavior; and (3) inter-
ventions that are not directly precipitated by the occurrence of a militarized dispute, i.e.,
interventions that surround the temporal boundaries of interstate disputes as recorded in the
MID data sets.
In this paper, we have briefly described the rationale and procedures that have guided
the process of data collection, and we have provided a descriptive overview of the content
and structure of the data. We have tried to show the usefulness of the data by using a
portion of them to answer the research question asked by Yamamoto and Bremer in their
1980 “Wider Wars and Restless Nights” article. We showed that Yamamoto and Bremer’s
(1980) original conclusion about the tendency of major-power states to draw each other
into ongoing conflicts is correct and is actually reinforced by the use of our data. Equally
important, our simple investigation shows that by looking at both nonmilitary and military
forms of intervention, we can now raise a broader set of hypotheses about the joining
behavior of major-power states and about the evolution of interstate conflicts. Overall,
our data should make it easier to address such questions. They should allow researchers
interested in interventions and joining behavior to develop even more refined hypotheses that
take into account other types of third parties, more discriminate manifestations of joining,
and a more realistic depiction of the timing and order of events that lead third parties to
become actual joiners.
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